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Teaching the EU as Part of Broader Courses
 There have been other EUSA forums in the past on 
how to organize courses about the EU.  These courses 
serve a useful purpose for students who want to learn 
specifically what the EU is and how it works, but it is also 
important to teach the EU as part of broader courses. 
The experience of the European Union is relevant to 
our understanding of politics in general – otherwise 
we would probably not be very interested in it.  If that 
is the case, then the EU can and should be integrated 
into generalist courses of political science, especially in 
the subfields of comparative politics and international 
relations.  
 That the EU should be taught as part of a bigger po-
litical science picture is easier said than done, however. 
The all-to-easy solution is to have a special class about 
the EU as a separate “sui generis” case of international 
politics or comparative politics.  We as teachers have all 
been tempted to do this… and we have probably suc-
cumbed to the temptation at least once or twice.  But 
we also know that it isn’t intellectually very satisfying.
 How can the EU be fitted into a regular political 
science syllabus?  Should the EU be taught as an ac-
tor, as a process, or as a “sui generis” phenomenon? 
What works with students, and what doesn’t?  I have 
asked these questions to two scholars of international 
relations and two scholars of comparative politics. 
Since I wanted to also get a sense of what works with 
non-European as well as European students, I decided, 
for each subfield, to pick one scholar based in America 
and one in Europe.  The following pieces – by Erik 
Jones, Brian Rathbun, Sabine Saurugger, and Maurits 
van der Veen – are these four scholars’ responses to 
these questions.  
 As the readers will realize, these responses are in 
some cases very personal, so their recipes will not work 
for everybody.  But I hope that they will provide food for 
thought on how to get our students excited about the 
EU, and to shake off the notion that European integra-





 European integration is globalization on steroids. 
That is what makes it fun to bring into the classroom, 
particularly in discussions of international political 
economy.  If you want to know what kind of beyond-the-
border measures it would take to level the playing field 
for international trade and investment, just look at the 
completion of the internal market.  If you are interested 
in the choice between fixed and flexible exchange rates, 
the various stages of monetary integration will give you 
a sense of what is at stake.  If you are worried about 
macroeconomic imbalances, check out the sovereign 
debt crisis in the eurozone.  And if you want to engage 
in a thought experiment about a world where workers 
can move freely across national boundaries, the historic 
enlargement of the European Union to the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the travails of Europe’s 
Schengen area should feed your imagination.
 The extreme European cases are not only found in 
macro-areas related to trade, capital movements, and 
migration flows.  They also arise in the policy process. 
Inter-governmentalism is ‘two-level games’.  The Ger-
man response to Europe’s sovereign debt crisis is a 
good illustration.  In February 2009, a center-left Ger-
man finance minister in a centrist grand coalition was 
willing to pledge that no country that adopted the euro 
as its currency would ever go bankrupt.  By the follow-
ing November, a center-right Chancellor in an even 
more right-wing coalition was unwilling to reiterate that 
commitment.  The German ‘national interest’ was the 
same in both cases but the domestic bargain was funda-
mentally different.  Chancellor Angela Merkel could not 
pledge to bail out insolvent eurozone countries without 
fracturing her coalition with the liberal Free Democratic 
Party or jeopardizing her own Christian Democrats’ 
performance in crucial regional elections.  She chose 
to muddle through instead, much to the detriment of 
Germany and Europe.
 In a similar vein, the European approach to technical 
harmonization shows the power of norms over mate-
rial self-interest.  A good example here is the choco-
late standard.  Originally, the European Commission 
proposed to set a threshold value for cocoa content 
in any confections to be called ‘chocolate’.  However, 
the British government objected.  The UK’s largest 
confectioner, Cadbury’s, makes sweets that are well 
below any reasonable threshold and yet did not want 
to market them as anything other than chocolate.  So 
the Commission settled on a requirement to publish the 
cocoa content instead.  Suddenly European consumers 
could see just how much cocoa was in their chocolate. 
As the new standard propagated across the market, it 
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carried new norms for quality chocolate along with it – 
carrying both British consumers and Cadbury’s profits 
along with it.
 Most important, Europe shows how institutions 
matter both in the domestic determinants of European 
politics and in the European determinants of domestic 
politics – Kenneth Waltz’s ‘second image’ and its re-
verse. The European Union is a common arena within 
which very different countries interact and it is also a 
common shock to which very different countries must 
adapt.  This is where it is possible to find the answers to 
questions about why some countries, like Luxembourg, 
tend to have more influence that their relative size would 
suggest, while others, like Italy, tend to have less.  This 
is where the role European Union jurisprudence be-
comes important and where the implementation of EU 
legislation matters as well.  And it is the key to explain 
why some countries were affected more strongly by 
the global economic and financial crisis while others 
were not – as well as why the effects across countries 
tended to vary so much over time.
 Finally, the European example is extreme because 
it is so unexpected.  Most students come into the class-
room with the presumption that Europe is old, tired, and 
perhaps even a little decadent (and not in a seductive 
way).  The reality is very different.  Scratch the surface 
and you will find that Europe is riddled with crime, 
corruption, violence, and xenophobia – but it is also a 
place of innovation, values, and cross-cultural dialog. 
European integration is an experiment for keeping the 
darker side of Europe in check.  If it looks boring on the 
surface that is only because the experiment has been 
a success.  Should it fail at some point in the future, we 





 When I was 19 years old, I went abroad for the first 
time - to Vienna, Austria for a semester-long program 
with the wind ensemble from my college. We took 
classes and rehearsed during the week and played 
concerts around Central Europe on the weekends. It 
was there that I first fell in love.
 No, not with a little Austrian girl in Tracht a la Sound 
of Music. I developed my first intellectual crush, in the 
European Community, about to become the European 
Union. The member countries – well, most of them - 
were about to embark on a revolutionary new project 
in international integration, developing a common cur-
rency. An Austrian politician – Andreas Kohl, who would 
later shepherd historically neutral Austria into the EU – 
taught us about how it worked. At famous coffee houses 
such as Café Museum, I read the English newspapers 
including the now defunct “European.” I followed the fate 
of the treaty in the British parliament, where it was ruth-
lessly denounced by the majority party despite the fact 
that John Major had secured opt-outs from all of its most 
sensitive elements. That semester dictated the rest of 
my life. I became a political science major and went 
to Berkeley to study with the great Ernst Haas. Even 
though the EU itself has never been directly the object 
of my published work, its themes guide my research 
still today - peace through multilateralism, international 
cooperation and organizations, and diplomacy. 
 When I teach about the European Union in my 
class on international organizations I try to kindle the 
same kind of student interest in this strange institu-
tion. But I can’t offer them good coffee. Everyone has 
been crushed by Starbucks. And everything about my 
institution in California points west - towards Asia and 
the future. All Europe is considered old here, not just 
the Western part. So what do I do? I think the worst 
thing one can try is to treat the European Union as just 
another international organization. Andy Moravcsik’s 
unfortunate influence on the field was, as a reviewer 
once wrote, to “demystify” the EU. Rather than the great 
hope for the future of liberal idealists, it is just a product 
of powerful interest groups in powerful countries making 
credible commitments to…..zzzzzzzzzz.  
 The first thing to do is to give students a sense of 
just how improbable the EU is considering the state of 
Europe after World War II. It took a profound act of po-
litical courage to start the political process of European 
integration given the scale of the war and its destruc-
tiveness. The notion that this was just simple politics 
as usual is so obviously wrong. It will also bore your 
students to tears. It was an audacious idea, and one that 
has never really been replicated anywhere else since. 
Students do not want to hear about how something was 
destined to happen. They want a story about a daring 
adventure in which an intrepid hero fought against all 
odds.  This has the advantage of being true, except he 
was not an action star but a technocrat whose name 
was Jean Monnet. 
 Second, and perhaps in contradiction, point out 
the ridiculousness of the EU. The organization can 
be, sometimes is, profoundly humorous. De Gaulle 
withdrew his representatives from Brussels during the 
Empty Chair Crisis like a child who wouldn’t let anyone 
play with his toys. The alliance between the Christian 
Democrat Chancellor Kohl and Socialist President 
Mitterrand was terribly improbable, something brought 
home by any image of the enormously rotund German 
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holding hands (yes, holding hands!) with the diminu-
tive Frenchman. You can find Thatcher’s “No! No! No!” 
speech on Youtube, where she diverts attention from 
her own internal party dissension by redirecting anger 
at the Labour Party and the European Commissioner 
Jacques Delors, all while being cat-called at Ques-
tion Time in a way that is shocking and funny to any 
American. When you cover the creation of the common 
currency and the ECB, you will have to deal with how 
the credible commitment to low inflation is ensured by 
the bank’s independence and how this was a necessity 
for Germany to join. Just don’t put it that way. Instead 
utilize the ECB’s own propaganda films for children. I am 
not kidding. The EU produces short cartoons teaching 
those in school about how the ECB protects them from 
the “inflation monster,” who is green and looks kind of 
like the Tasmanian devil. And don’t even get me started 
with the banana regulations. If they are like my students, 
they will be mystified, which is just what we want. 
Brian Rathbun
University of Southern California
Teaching Comparative Politics and the EU
Sabine Saurugger
 Teaching comparative politics in European univer-
sities has become an even more complex endeavour 
that it was before the end of the cold war. Before the 
beginning of the 1990s, teaching comparative politics 
required an understanding of the structure and func-
tioning of political systems of the biggest European 
states, and a number of smaller states – added for good 
measure. Comparing states’ governmental institutions, 
judiciary, political parties, electoral systems, public poli-
cies and interest groups required a in-depth knowledge 
of these issues but also a high degree of abstract think-
ing, which helped to create categories allowing to go 
beyond simple case studies. 
 Since the Single European Act, the Maastricht 
Treaty and intensified globalisation processes, I teach 
comparative politics with a sense of urgency. Not only 
is it necessary to constantly update our classes (adding 
the names of new presidents, chancellors or prime min-
isters) as we did before. It has become crucial to take 
into account the continued impact European integration 
and globalisation had on domestic political systems. 
 Now, explaining to European comparative politics 
students, generally rather fed up with the classes they 
had on the EU – as an institution, as a decision-making 
system, as a historical entity – that they must listen 
and discuss issues linked to the European Union often 
leads to critical remarks. This is the case at least when 
they are political science students in France, generally 
a rather critical bunch of young people.  So I talk about 
the political side of the EU’s influence on the domestic 
level. The debates on employment policies can’t be un-
derstood without taking into account EMU or the Open 
Method of Coordination. It is not possible to explain 
comparative budgetary politics, domestic environmen-
tal or agricultural policies, or the comparative party 
manifestos, without taking into account compliance 
pressures stemming from both EU hard law and soft 
law: the Economic and Monetary Union, the Common 
Agricultural Policy, the European Environmental Policy, 
or the rise of Euro-scepticism in divers forms across all 
political parties. 
 Once this is done, the real work begins. It is crucial 
in this context to forget about the “absolute beauty of the 
EU’s peace and love message of the 1950s and 1960s”. 
Nothing is worse in a comparative politics class than to 
hear about the great achievements and the inevitability 
of the European integration process. These achieve-
ments can be taken for granted. Today, it’s the conflicts, 
the debates, the banana wars and Euro-conflicts, the 
Santer resignation (albeit an old story) or the influence 
of debates taking place in the European Parliament – 
real politics – on national debates that students crave 
for – well, not really crave for, but are interested in. In 
this sense, the Europeanization literature has tremen-
dously facilitated my teaching of comparative politics. 
 There is, however also another way to look on 
teaching comparative politics: it then becomes a tool 
to study the European Union as such. In this ‘compara-
tive politics of the EU’ class, I use methods developed 
in comparative politics to study the political system of 
the European Union – something that seems to have 
become somewhat of a consensus today. This helps 
students understand the EU through comparisons with 
domestic politics and links with broader debates in 
political science. Again, this tremendously helps them 
not to see the EU as some sui generis far-away thing 
in Brussels, but as a system that is all over the place. 
The problem for teaching the EU was for a long time its 
love for technical jargon, even in political science – not 
to even mention law. The perceived end of the permis-
sive consensus, and the subsequent politicisation of the 
EU (which does not end its jargon) have offered me the 
possibilities to make students understand that the EU 
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The European Union as a Comparative 
Politics “case”
A. Maurits van der Veen
 Where and how does the European Union fit into 
comparative politics? For many American students, 
unfortunately, the EU is simply synonymous with the 
eurozone. In light both of the real-world prominence 
of the European Union in politics, and of its theoretical 
interest as a sui generis experiment in something akin 
to state-building, this state of knowledge deserves to 
be remedied in broad comparative politics courses, not 
just in courses specifically focused on the EU. Probably 
the most common approach is simply to add a unit on 
European integration towards the end of the course. 
I want to argue here that doing so misses a valuable 
opportunity for promoting student understanding of 
comparative politics in general. 
 In fact, the European Union is an excellent “case” to 
illustrate a host of different topics, for two reasons. First, 
although it is not a state, it does many things states do, 
and thus represents an outlier in comparison to which 
“normal” states can be better understood. Second, 
unlike in most states, almost everything the European 
Union does is the result of explicit, and often strategic, 
decision-making on the part of its member states. 
Moreover, we often have at our disposal records of and 
information about these decisions. In many states, in 
contrast, historical accident or political forces long-since 
spent account for institutional and legal outcomes vis-
ible today.
 Consider, by way of example, the issue of electoral 
systems. Elections to the European Parliament are by 
proportional representation. This is no historical acci-
dent: it was extensively debated, and we have records 
of the arguments made on all sides. Moreover, different 
countries have chosen different versions of proportional 
representation. In addition, several countries — most 
prominently the United Kingdom — use an electoral 
system for EP elections that is different from that for 
national elections. In other words, all the key consid-
erations and implications associated with electoral 
structures can be covered simply by studying the vari-
ous EU-level and national decisions on the issue.
 Nor are electoral systems the only issue where the 
EU is a valuable case. For any discussion of the nature 
and implications of national identity, the EU’s struggles 
to develop something akin to an “EU identity” serve to 
highlight many of the key puzzles associated with iden-
tity. In studying the state’s role in fostering economic 
development, the EU’s experience with regional and 
cohesion policy can illustrate key challenges. On is-
sues of governance, the EU represents an interesting 
case of multi-level governance, demonstrating, among 
others, that legislative and implementing powers need 
not reside at the same level. The EU’s struggles with 
legitimacy and its perceived democratic deficit similarly 
offer great material for the investigation of these topics.
With this approach, students will not need to read much 
EU-specific literature; instead, the EU can simply be 
used as an in-class example to illustrate issues raised 
in concept- or issue-focused readings. Of course, some 
minimal background information about the EU will be im-
portant if the EU case is to make any sense to students. 
Fortunately, this is easily addressed by asking them to 
read one of several simple introductions that exist. The 
EU itself offers “Europe in ten points” (http://ec.europa.
eu/publications/booklets/eu_glance/12/txt_en.htm, by 
Pascal Fontaine); the first point, a brief history, is re-
ally all that is needed to get started. (I prefer this to the 
EU’s “guide for Americans,” http://www.eurunion.org/eu/
Guide-for-Americans/Guide-for-Americans.html.) Once 
armed with the basics, students should be equipped to 
consider the EU as an unusual but nevertheless illumi-
nating case in studying a host of issues. 
A. Maurits van der Veen
College of William & Mary
The EUSA Executive Committee is 
pleased to announce the online publica-
tion of the first EUSA Biennial Conference 
Special Issue of the Journal of European 
Public Policy (JEPP). This Special Is-
sue includes seven (revised) papers se-
lected by peer review from amongst those 
nominated by discussants and chairs as 
among the best presented at 2011 Bien-
nial EUSA conference. The Special Issue 
can be found at http://www.tandfonline.
com. The paper version is now available. 
We look forward to continuing this collabo-
ration between JEPP and EUSA in the fu-
ture and expect that 6-8 papers from the 
2013 EUSA Conference, May 9-11, 2013, 
to be held in the Baltimore/Washington DC 
metro area, will again be selected for publi-
cation in a future special JEPP/EUSA issue.
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Removing the Barriers to Learning about the EU
Simon Usherwood
 One of the most frequent refrains that I hear from 
colleagues teaching on the European Union is that 
‘students find it difficult.’  Indeed, it appears to be not 
only difficult for students, but also for teaching staff: to 
look at much at what has been written on Learning & 
Teaching (L&T) on the EU, there is a surfeit of discus-
sion about ‘complexity’, ‘intricacies’ and ‘barriers to 
learning’.  Even when teaching staff are positive about 
the subject, students (especially in the UK) can often 
be suspicious that there is a normative agenda at work, 
to make them love the Union!
 This is neither healthy nor sustainable.  Students 
might approach the subject with trepidation (if we’re 
lucky) or apathy (if we’re not), but too often we are 
complicit in providing an excuse for not engaging or not 
understanding.  The EU joins other ‘difficult’ subjects – 
research methods springs to mind – in a dusty corner 
of L&T, to be taught as a necessity, with no great delight 
on either side of the classroom.
 This has to change: the EU is a fundamental part 
of contemporary European (and global) politics and 
to ignore it will only perpetuate the problems of low 
understanding that we find in the general population. 
Three key ways of addressing this challenge present 
themselves.
 Firstly, we need to understand our students’ atti-
tudes and dispositions much better.  Whether through 
quantitative questionnaires or more qualitative inter-
views, we have to build up a clearer picture of students’ 
prior knowledge, their interests within ‘the EU’, as well 
as their prior concerns about building their understand-
ing. This might be about basic concepts of suprana-
tionalism versus intergovernmentalism, or about more 
practical aspects of what each institution is called (the 
all-too-familiar ‘European Council/Council of Europe’ 
problem).
 As social scientists we would expect ourselves to 
ground any research project in the data we have, and 
this is no different: regardless of our theoretical ap-
proach to the Union, we still have to bring that into the 
specific environment of the classroom and make it work 
for our students, ipso facto we need to understand our 
students.
 Secondly, we have to change our attitude as teach-
ers.  The EU might not be a simple political organisa-
tion, but it is no more complex than a typical state: that 
teaching of the former usually tries to cover everything, 
while teaching of the latter often focuses on particular 
parts (legislatures, executives, etc.) might obscure this. 
This requires stress on the simplicity of underlying con-
cepts: two-level games or principal-agent relationships 
are just two examples that spring to mind.
 Importantly, it is not about ‘selling’ the integration 
process in normative terms: understanding is not the 
same as approbation.  Certainly, enthusiasm for one’s 
subject is a great bonus for a teacher, but just as we 
bring different theoretical and analytical tools to bear 
on our research of the EU, so too can we bring different 
attitudes.  Indeed, if we are to build student engage-
ment, then we have to be able to accommodate different 
positions if we are not risk shutting down debate.
 Consequently, in my classes on European integra-
tion, I spend a significant block of time talking about 
core concepts in more abstract terms, before apply-
ing them back into the context of the EU.  Colleagues 
elsewhere have made conscious efforts to discuss the 
Union through the use of metaphors and analogies.  My 
personal favourite comes from the team at the Catholic 
University of Paris, where they describe the Union as a 
student house, with bedrooms that are private to each 
student, but with communal areas (kitchen, bathroom, 
etc.) that require joint management.  Such intuitively 
simple models act as heuristics to learning as much as 
anything else, opening up debate, rather than closing 
it down.
 Thirdly, and rather less obviously, we might talk less 
about the European Union, in the sense of it being the 
object of our study.  Instead, we might profit from talking 
about other subjects, illustrated through the example 
of Union.  At a recent conference, one colleague dis-
cussed how her own realisation that the EU was a site 
of politics enabled her to completely and fundamentally 
reconceptualise her approach to the subject.
 This is an area where non-traditional pedagogies 
have a clear role to play.  Many colleagues already use 
simulation games to explore case studies within the EU, 
but they can also be used as starting points for students’ 
understanding of negotiating dynamics and institutional 
constraints.  Moreover, simulations develop students’ 
skills in research, presentation, working with other and 
negotiation as well as enhancing their conceptualisa-
tions of more generic questions of politics, such as 
power, compromise and consensus.  Likewise, problem-
based learning techniques can offer a very powerful way 
into complex questions and issues, placing the student 
front and centre in that process: Maastricht University 
is an excellent example of how this approach can be 
used across an entire course of study, asking critical 
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Such techniques are labour-intensive, but they offer 
space to both teachers and students to escape from 
the shackles of ‘difficulty’, by opening up new ways to 
conceptualise and debate the subject material.  More 
particularly, they instrumentalise knowledge and learn-
ing, giving it a clear and immediate purpose: certainly, 
I have yet to encounter a student who has not found 
a simulation to be of some interest and use for them-
selves.
 Ultimately, by taking these steps and challenging 
our (and students’) preconceptions about the European 
Union we can move out of this attitudinal problem, to the 
point where we can start to simply concentrate on the 
key questions about the integration process that inter-
est us, rather than how we go about discussing them. 
Indeed, even if that goal isn’t achieved immediately, 
then we should still take succour from the simple fact 
of trying.  Compared to many other areas of social sci-
ences, European studies has been relatively proactive 
in engaging with non-traditional pedagogies: I would 
venture to say that we all know someone who has gone 
beyond the lecture/seminar model in their teaching of 
the EU.  Even if these various efforts don’t always work, 
the mere fact of trying has made EU studies something 
of a hotbed of experimentation.  Thus we might do well 
to take that out to our colleagues in other subjects, to 
show them the potential of challenging conventional 
thinking.
 While we cannot change the fortunes of the Euro-
pean Union itself, we can change how we try to engage 
with it as teachers.  In so doing, we can help students 
to get beyond their preconceptions – both of the subject 
and of the way it’s taught – we can make for a learning 
environment that interests and stimulates us, and we 
can offer something to the wider community by way of 
pedagogic practice.  The path is already sketched out: 
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Political Economy Interest Section Re-
Rebuilding European Economic Governance: 
Strengthening Supranational Institutions through 
Intergovernmentalism
Michele Chang, Georg Menz and Mitchell P. Smith
 As the sovereign debt crisis rages on, the Eu-
rozone has been struggling to shore up market confi-
dence in the short-run and lay a stronger foundation for 
the currency area in the long-run by reforming European 
economic governance. The monetary arm of Economic 
and Monetary Union has been strengthened through 
the expansion of the European Central Bank’s powers 
into a de facto lender of last resort and the creation of 
a crisis fund, the European Stability Mechanism. Fiscal, 
financial and economic policy cooperation were but-
tressed through mechanisms ranging from directives 
and regulations to intergovernmental treaties. Numer-
ous commentators have noted the existing intergovern-
mental nature of EMU (Hodson 2011) has become more 
pronounced since the onset of the global financial crisis 
(Puetter 2012). A  forthcoming special issue of the Jour-
nal of European Integration  explores the recent reforms 
and concludes that the redefinition of European eco-
nomic governance has resulted in a diminished reliance 
on the "community method" characterized by European 
Commission agenda setting, but that the powers of the 
supranational institutions have actually increased as a 
whole. Institutionally, select nodes within the Council of 
the European Union -- the permanent Council presiden-
cy and the Ecofin Council -- have taken a firmer hand in 
agenda-setting. Nevertheless a series of recent institu-
tional and policy innovations have advanced economic 
integration and given more power to supranational insti-
tutions such as the Commission, the European Parlia-
ment and the ECB.   
 We are witnessing the emergence of a more 
"Europeanized" economic governance through unex-
pected means, as both national governments and Euro-
pean institutional actors remain committed to salvaging 
the euro. The deficiencies of the Maastricht frame-
work have undermined market confidence in the euro 
area, in contrast to other economies that have worse 
economic records but still pay lower interest rates on 
their sovereign debt (De Grauwe and Ji 2012). Despite 
weaknesses in the original structure of EMU, to a cer-
tain extent the problems faced by economic integration 
were foreseeable as early as the 1960s. In a compari-
son of the European Commission's 2008 assessment of 
EMU@10 with its 1962 "Action Programme for the Sec-
ond Stage" of the development of the Common Market, 
David Andrews finds that early on the Commission cor-
rectly identified numerous problems faced by the Eu-
rozone today, in particular macroeconomic imbalances 
between countries and divergent developments in unit 
labour costs and competitiveness.  Resonating with the 
1962 action programme, the Commission also adhered 
to a general approach of long-standing: moving towards 
“ever closer union” by embracing the principle of engre-
nage.  All the more perplexing, then, is why the Com-
mission was quite reserved as an entrepreneur in taking 
steps to rectify the problems that have emerged with the 
single currency.
 In particular, the irreversibility of economic and 
monetary union is questioned, as it lacks a suprana-
tional executive with enough discretion and resources 
to make EMU credible.  Kenneth Dyson carefully maps 
this terrain of "supreme emergency" in his contribution 
to the special issue, motivated by the insight that rules 
relying on the behaviour of markets and states are un-
likely to operate as expected in crisis conditions.  He es-
tablishes that any authority to invoke such a prerogative 
would have to be vested in an independent agent, but 
the political resistance that such arrangements would 
provoke makes it unlikely that the issue will be resolved 
soon.
 The crisis has unleashed an interesting power 
dynamic involving a decisive shift away from the commu-
nity method and towards much more intergovernmen-
tally-inspired responses. National governments actively 
sought to reduce agency slack accruing to supranation-
al institutions, shifting agenda setting authority to the 
Council President and Ecofin, thereby establishing a 
hierarchy that subordinated the role of the Commission 
to these actors.  Picking up on this interaction, Dermot 
Hodson explores the role of the Barroso Commission, 
finding a cautious player carefully safeguarding the in-
stitution's political capital and strategically supporting 
minimalist re-regulatory activity with substantial political 
support in the member states. Hodson notes that the 
center-right political leaning of the Barroso Commission 
further contributes to an ultimately limited Commission 
response, effectively affirming the monetarist-inspired 
Maastricht criteria and avoiding substantial taming of 
the financial markets. 
 Although monetary integration has always ex-
hibited strong intergovernmental characteristics, Mi-
chele Chang writes of the negotiations for fiscal policy 
cooperation that began under the community method 
became increasingly intergovernmental over time: in 
the six-pack agreement on enhanced fiscal coopera-
tion, the European Council created a rival organization, 
the Van Rompuy Task Force (comprised of finance min-
isters from Ecofin), to work with the Commission to for-
mulate the proposals, thus impinging on the latter’s right 
of initiative. The subsequent Treaty on Stability, Coordi-
nation and Governance was negotiated as an intergov-
ernmental treaty, though most of the provisions could 
have been done according to the community method. 
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Thus even matters that could be handled according to 
the community method were effectively re-intergovern-
mentalized.
 An intergovernmental outcome was not always 
intentional: Ledina Gocaj and Sophie Meunier analyse 
the hasty creation of the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and its successor, the European Stabil-
ity Mechanism (ESM), as examples of path dependen-
cy that cemented the intergovernmental nature of the 
former. Although the structure and design of the EFSF 
were suboptimal, its creation during a time of crisis con-
strained future possibilities and its intergovernmental 
features were perpetuated. 
 Such shifts towards what Angela Merkel de-
scribes as the “Union method” are perhaps unsurpris-
ing given the substantial financial commitments entered 
into by northern governments for years to come. EMU 
under the Maastricht Treaty did not include instruments 
such as close fiscal and financial coordination, with the 
assumption that adherence to the rules established in 
these areas would be sufficient, with euro area govern-
ments keeping their respective fiscal situations under 
control. Nikolaos Zahariadis notes that this principle of 
fiscal federalism at the European level contributed to 
the current crisis, raising the spectre of national gov-
ernments taking on more responsibility to address the 
aftermath. Ramunas Vilpisauskas’ contribution echoes 
this point in its examination of how domestic politics 
have constrained the ability of the euro area to engage 
in redistributive policies.
 National economic divergence provides one 
clue to the prominence of national governments in de-
fining the emerging contours of EU economic gover-
nance.  At the same time, such divergence may well be 
an impediment to efficient decision making and effective 
outcomes.  For example, Charlotte Rommerskirchen 
explores the inability of the EU or euro area to effec-
tively combine their representation in multilateral fora, 
leading to inefficiencies and a reduced European voice. 
Despite some cautious delegation at the G-20, princi-
pals remain very restrained in employing agents and 
jealously safeguard their hold on interest representation 
at the global level. We also see evidence for this in the 
manner in which the EU has translated financial rules 
negotiated in multilateral fora -- such as the banking 
regulation agreed in the context of the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision in 2010 -- into EU law.  As Da-
vid Howarth and Lucia Quaglia demonstrate, member 
state preferences are shaped by structural features of 
national political economies, including the capital posi-
tion, leverage ratios of banks, and the nature of their 
financing arrangements. An intergovernmental bargain-
ing process ensued that altered the application of the 
Basel rules to the EU context. 
 The prominence of member states, particularly 
Germany and France, in dealing with the crisis must not 
distract us from the noteworthy policy entrepreneurship 
of the European Central Bank (ECB). Jonathan Yian-
gou, Mícheál O'Keeffe and Gabriel Glöckler demon-
strate how the monetary financing prohibition, by clos-
ing off one channel to the resolution of the Eurozone 
crisis, pushed the process onto an alternative path that 
resulted in more integration, with the ECB playing a vi-
tal role. The visibility and importance of the ECB as an 
institution has risen dramatically as a result of the crisis, 
serving not only as an instigator of more integration but 
also emerging as a powerful actor in its own right. Fran-
cisco Torres outlines the legitimacy questions faced by 
the ECB in light of this “strategic political role” that has 
been assumed by what had previously been deemed 
a primarily technocratic institution. The legitimacy issue 
becomes particularly difficult given the propensity of the 
ECB to push for further cooperation and for national-
level reforms.
 The special issue promotes three key findings: 
First, rather than permitting facile generalizations about 
the response being coloured by a supranational or an 
intergovernmental shade, the empirical and analytical 
reality is significantly more complex. As we document, 
it is difficult to categorize the response as being truly 
shaped by the community method. The Union meth-
od seems to be guided significantly more by member 
states than might have been anticipated given the po-
litical constellations prior to the crisis. In truth, member 
state governments have been faced with an indecisive 
and uninspiring Commission, but they also hesitated 
to accept top-down Europeanization and a significant 
power shift to European-level institutions. 
 In fact, one of the more interesting phenomena 
that emerged during the Eurozone crisis is the ongoing 
power struggle between the German government, the 
Bundesbank, and its representatives in the ECB. The 
struggle seems as much informed by disagreements 
over policy content as over the desirability of full fiscal 
union. The ‘German’ argument highlights the ignored 
dangers implicit in inflation, unsustainable and undesir-
able debt burdens, and massive wealth redistribution 
to a limited number of financial institutions, in contrast 
to the calls for more solidarity and the need to keep 
the euro area intact. Thus, the somewhat muddled re-
sponse is yet again a case of containing both strongly 
intergovernmental elements – the rescue vehicles in 
particular – and supranational touches, notably in the 
form of the six-pack and the European semester. Ulti-
mately, however, given the strong interest of the Ger-
man government in securing and re-affirming the Maas-
tricht criteria, even ostensibly supranational elements 
are strongly coloured by one government’s preferences. 
 Second, our analysis points to the emergence 
of two key actors, the European Parliament and the 
ECB. The post-Lisbon ordinary legislative procedure 
enabled the EP to avert the Commission’s attempts to 
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water down financial market re-regulation and Ecofin’s 
efforts to dilute the six-pack, asserting itself as a self-
confident actor willing – and more importantly, able – to 
flex its muscles. A second pivotal actor that deserves 
more scholarly scrutiny is the ECB and its policy entre-
preneurship. We detect a divided policy agenda here, 
with bank officials dedicated to not only salvaging the 
euro at any cost, but also pushing for fiscal union in the 
absence of unlimited lending or Eurobonds, effectively 
curtailed by the German Constitutional Court ruling of 
12 September 2012. This agenda is not shared by all 
representatives in the governing council because of its 
obvious financial and political fall-out. The ECB can be 
said to have acted as a decisive, at times even shrewd 
actor in pursuing its favoured strategy. In fact, much of 
the empirical story reads like one of quiet, yet power-
ful, mission creep.  
 Third, our work points to the importance of del-
egation, its limits, its potential, and its implications for 
policy output and its legitimacy. The recently reawak-
ened scholarly interest in applying the principal-agent 
framework to European studies bears testimony to the 
increasing significance of delegation as a governance 
tool at the EU level. A number of our contributors de-
ploy this framework, exploring the often very tight 
room for manoeuvre afforded to the appointed agents. 
In politically sensitive and extremely costly affairs, 
principals are understandably conservative in allotting 
influence to the executing agents. 
 The developments charted and analysed here 
point to the familiar picture of the Franco-German alli-
ance acting as an engine (or not) in European integra-
tion. The Deauville meeting is a case in point: the pro-
active role of the Germans was not quite mirrored by 
developments in Paris, where a weak and confused 
leadership struggled to identify a coherent policy. The 
parties eschewed rapid and decisive action in 2010 
in favour of a piecemeal response to what were then 
portrayed as largely self-inflicted economic difficulties 
in one marginal southern member state. Events since 
have highlighted the enormous financial cost of the 
dithering and hesitation, contrasting German Chancel-
lor Angela Merkel with her political godfather, Helmut 
Kohl, at another singular historical moment. 
 Events at the national level also point to the 
significant prospect of political upheaval. It is worth 
highlighting the potential for government default on 
debts in Greece, as well as escalating political violence 
in the repression of anti-austerity demonstrations and 
the anti-immigrant tensions actively promoted by the 
Golden Dawn movement. In Spain, all the necessary 
ingredients for prolonged economic and political tur-
moil are present: serious and sustained financial dif-
ficulties by both the Spanish governments and some 
of the autonomous regions; a vocal separatist move-
ment in Catalonia and the Basque Country; and mass 
youth employment. Meanwhile, in Italy as elsewhere 
in Mediterranean Europe, the consequences of a 
pronounced competitiveness gap with Germany and 
the dire political consequences of extended austerity 
are such that a voluntary Eurozone exit by any of the 
southern countries cannot be entirely ruled out. 
 As if there was not enough uncertainty and po-
tential for serious political conflict and civil unrest in 
the south, central European countries both within and 
outside the Eurozone are vulnerable. Slovenia, Slo-
vakia, and Hungary are all experiencing severe bud-
getary problems; Hungary is also witnessing the re-
emergence of colourful populists with little more than 
a nominal commitment to the values of liberal democ-
racy. 
 All of these rising tensions suggest it is nec-
essary to raise the question not only of whether the 
Eurozone crisis can has been merely kicked down the 
road, but also why and in whose interest the kicking 
continues. Defending the single currency commands a 
hefty political and economic price tag, placing increas-
ing demands on member states and EU economic 
governance. While many of the weaknesses of euro 
area economic governance are being addressed, the 
redistribution of capital and reallocation of power that 
this entails makes it important to establish credibility 
not just with market actors but with euro area citizens. 
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Davis Cross, Mai’a K. Security Integration in Europe: 
How Knowledge-based Networks are Transforming the 
European Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2011.
 In ‘Security Integration in Europe: How Knowl-
edge-based Networks are Transforming the European 
Union’, Mai’a K. Davis Cross examines security integra-
tion in Europe, a topic that has received a lot of scholarly 
attention in recent years. As the European Union (EU) 
has taken new initiatives to reform its security realm, 
this is a well-timed book that brings a fresh perspective 
to the field. 
 Davis Cross analyzes security integration 
through the lens of ‘knowledge-based networks’.  She 
provides a comprehensive theoretical account of how 
different security networks function as ‘epistemic com-
munities’. By placing a much required emphasis on 
both the internal and external dimensions of security 
in Europe, Davis Cross contributes both to the security 
studies and EU literatures with an attention-grabbing 
study that relies on rich insight from almost eighty inter-
views and primary documents.
 The book is divided into six chapters. Following 
the introduction, the first chapter discusses why knowl-
edge based networks and epistemic communities mat-
ter for security integration. The chapter does a thorough 
job of explaining the historical background of the con-
cept and delineating the causal mechanisms through 
which epistemic communities contribute to integration. 
The epistemic communities Davis Cross assesses are 
diplomats, high-level military officers, scientists, and 
civilian crisis experts. The qualitative measurement of 
the strength of epistemic communities is a challenging 
undertaking; and it is debatable whether the four key 
independent variables (selection and training, meeting 
frequency and quality, shared professional norms and 
common culture) always lead to more cohesiveness in 
the community. The second chapter provides a compre-
hensive account of the current state of the security inte-
gration in Europe. After these chapters that provide the 
theoretical and historical foundation on which her argu-
ments are based, Davis Cross presents the results of 
her case studies from four different epistemic communi-
ties. Chapter 3, ‘Diplomats and Internal Security’,  looks 
at how diplomats in the Committee of Permanent Rep-
resentatives  (Coreper) pave the way for furthering the 
security integration, by giving the example of the 2005 
Strategy on Radicalization and Recruitment developed 
by Coreper. Davis Cross’ explanation of Coreper’s influ-
ence on the EU action plan is very compelling. However, 
as admitted by the author, integration has been uneven 
in many areas which might leave some question marks 
regarding the cohesiveness of the community. Chapter 
4, ‘Diplomats and External Security’, takes the Politi-
cal and Security Committee’ (PSC) as its knowledge-
based network, and shows that PSC is a moderate-
strength epistemic community. This chapter is useful in 
understanding how Coreper and PSC compare to each 
other. It will take certainly some more time to assess 
whether the PSC will or will not prove to be effective as 
the Common Security and Defense Policy develops in 
the near future. Chapter 5 looks at the European Union 
Military Committee (EUMC) as a crucial epistemic com-
munity. As the real impact of the ‘Long-Term Vision’ for 
European Defence Capability will be evaluated in 2025, 
there exists room for further research on this topic. One 
issue that is mentioned, and deserves further explora-
tion, is how being ‘double-hatted’ to NATO affects the 
influence of certain military officers on European se-
curity integration.  Chapter 6 examines scientists and 
military experts as ‘loose and nascent epistemic com-
munities’. This chapter is also useful to understand how 
civilian crisis management is actually a key component 
of security integration. It also presents the other side 
of the epistemic community discussion, where Davis 
Cross argues that Civilian Crisis Management Commit-
tee is not yet a fully developed epistemic community. 
The conclusion is concise and informative, putting the 
findings into perspective and addressing concerns that 
should be closely monitored when thinking about Euro-
pean security.
 Davis Cross makes her case for selecting the 
‘most likely’ actors and not taking European think tanks 
working on security as cases on their own. According to 
her argument, think tanks are not cohesive enough to 
function as epistemic communities. Nevertheless, the 
argument that they are not epistemic communities is 
also telling. It would have been stimulating to expand 
on this argument, with a specific assessment of how 
security think tanks contribute or do not contribute to 
security integration as networks in their own right, com-
paring them with epistemic communities.
 The main aim of the book is to single out the 
processes by which actors related to both external and 
internal security transform European security integra-
tion. Through a novel framework, Davis Cross has suc-
ceeded in revealing these mechanisms at work. The 
discussion of whether the EU has become or is success-
fully becoming a global security actor will need further 
elaboration for the argument on the ‘transformation’ of 
the EU to become more convincing for the future. Davis 
Cross’ arguments build on a rich theoretical basis and 
a sound literature review. A more explicit elucidation of 
how this work relates to the Constructivist approach 
in International Relations would add to the theoretical 
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are of course an important prelude to the long run. As 
a result, the reader must remain vigilant throughout the 
book if he or she does not want to miss the new ele-
ments on the politics of privatization in postcommunist 
Europe that are on offer here. Otherwise, the reader will 
reach the end of the book and feel that the author has 
not really broken any new ground, though the privatiza-
tion stories that are presented are rich in details and 
well explained.
 The book answers its central question with the 
help of one theoretical and five empirical chapters. 
Chapter 3, on the politics of privatization, details the 
book’s theoretical arguments while offering an excel-
lent review of the literature on postcommunist privatiza-
tions. Chapters 4 to 7 present individual case studies 
of Czechoslovakia (to set the table for what happened 
after separation), the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Ukraine. The final empirical chapter (#8) covers privati-
zation politics in Serbia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. It cor-
responds to an article that the author previously pub-
lished in the Review of International Political Economy 
in 2008. For the book’s benefit, however, it would have 
been better to replace this multicountry chapter with a 
chapter devoted to the Russian case, which continues 
to fascinate to this day with Vladimir Putin’s recent re-
turn to the presidency. It would be interesting to see 
how well Russia fits into Gould’s argument. To this re-
viewer, it seems that it does so very well, which is why 
it would have been nice to have the details included in 
this book.
 On page 6, Gould mentions that his book is not 
only aimed at scholars and policymakers, which it is, 
but also at undergraduates who by now were born after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. This is why he kindly offers the 
reader chapter 2, which is for those readers who do not 
remember or know what the command economy was 
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The chapter 
explains where privatization was starting from, the chal-
lenges it was facing, and the schools of thought that 
were pushing it in one direction or another. Finally, it 
puts privatization in the broader context of economic 
reforms in postcommunist Europe.
 In sum, this book will be excellent for the class-
room in courses on Central and Eastern Europe or in 
comparative political economy. For scholars who focus 
their work on the political economy of postcommunist 
Europe, however, they will find it frustrating even if 
useful, because they will have to sift through a lot of 
already-known details to get the bits that are new to the 
literature. Finally, for the larger political economy audi-
ence, this book will be an enjoyable read.
Patrick Leblond
richness of the book.  In the concluding chapter, Davis 
Cross rightfully addresses the problem of democratic 
deficit, which is a possible issue of concern in multi-
level governance settings. This book, which draws on 
impressive first-hand research, is highly recommended 
to scholars, policy makers and all those interested in 
understanding how the security integration has been 
unfolding in Europe. 
Yasemin Irepoglu
Gould, John A. The Politics of Privatization: Wealth 
and Power in Postcommunist Europe. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2011.
 The first pages of John Gould’s book do not 
make a good first impression. Quickly, one feels that it 
is of limited scholarly value because it is ten years too 
late. Today, there is nothing novel about a book argu-
ing that high-quality institutions (e.g., the rule of law, 
strong property rights and their protection, low levels of 
corruption, etc.) matter for privatization to be success-
ful and that, as a result, privatization in postcommunist 
Europe did not lead to the kind of political liberalization 
that many people, most notably economists, anticipat-
ed in the early 1990s. One wonders why would Lynne 
Rienner publish such a book. It makes no sense!
 Then, on page 5, the heavy fog lifts. The book 
finally reveals its raison d’être. The point of the book is 
not so much to argue for the importance of institutions 
in successful privatization or to criticize economists 
for getting it wrong about the ability of privatization to 
foster liberal democracy but to show that existing argu-
ments and explanations are “incomplete” (p. 183). As 
such, Gould’s book is less interested about what hap-
pened politically in postcommunist Europe during and 
immediately after privatization than on what happened 
years later. Rather than focusing solely on how “[i]n 
the short run privatization was indeed used by former 
communists and others to consolidate their control over 
the political and economic life of the country” (p. 5), the 
book wants to pay close attention to the “long run” and 
explain why in some countries at some point in time the 
beneficiaries of privatization came to support political 
liberalization. In other words: why did these post-priva-
tization beneficiaries defect? In essence, that is the re-
search question that this book answers.
 Surprisingly perhaps, the author makes his own 
formulation of this research question available to the 
reader only on page 40 and does so in a somewhat 
obscure fashion — i.e. one has to be on the lookout for 
it since the author does not highlight it for the reader. In 
fact, the book’s main purpose has a tendency to get lost 
in the details of “short run” privatization politics, which 
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Craig, Paul and De Búrca, Gráinne. EU Law. Text, 
Cases, and Materials Fifth Edition. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2011.
 EU integration is a project in continuing evolu-
tion. Consequently, it is inevitable an equally continu-
ous revision of books aimed at giving a comprehensive 
presentation of EU law. This is true, in particular, when 
a major change of the EU Treaties occurs, but it must 
not be underestimated that also the “ordinary” action 
of EU – and member States – institutions, and the ac-
companying analysis of EU law scholars, produce new 
materials that is necessary to include into the analysis 
of this fast moving area of law.
 This is the fifth edition – in less than fifteen 
years – of a volume that has earned the reputation as 
“definitive” and “classic” textbook of EU law, authored 
by two prominent experts in the field, based at Ox-
ford and Harvard respectively, that have been working 
closely as an author team for nearly twenty years. This 
new edition not only reflects the institutional and sub-
stantive changes made by the Lisbon Treaty, but also 
the further major case law, legislative developments 
and policy initiatives occurred in the last four years, 
with modification of existing chapters, creation of new 
chapters, and rearrangement of the order of the mate-
rial in parts of the book. 
 Substantial revisions are dedicated to EU in-
stitutions, legal instruments, competence, legislation 
and decision making process, human rights guaran-
tee (including coverage of Kadi and other anti-terrorist 
sanctions cases), citizenship (including coverage of the 
Rottman, Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy and other recent 
cases), international relations law, anti-discrimination 
law (including full coverage of the Article 19 Race Di-
rective and Framework Equality Directives, and case 
law including Test-Achats, Roca Alvarez, and the main 
age discrimination cases).
 After two useful and detailed tables of cases, 
treaties, instruments and legislation, that give to the 
reader the possibility to jump directly, if desired, into 
the topic of interest, and the necessary table of equiv-
alence between the Lisbon Treaty provisions and the 
corresponding provisions of old Treaties, the volume is 
divided into twenty-nine chapters. However, the gen-
eral outline of the book may be divided into two main 
parts. 
 The first part covers topics of institutional na-
ture: the presentation and analysis of EU institutions, 
their competences and  functioning; the relationship 
between EU and national law; the role of the EU in in-
ternational relations, and the role of human rights in the 
EU legal system; the procedures and remedies estab-
lished by the Treaties for the guarantee of the EU legal 
system: enforcement actions against member States, 
the preliminary ruling system and legal remedies 
against EU acts.
 The second half of the book, on the other hand, 
has more substantive nature, being dedicated to EU 
policies (single market, free movement of goods, capi-
tals, workers and services, EU citizenship, equal treat-
ment and non-discrimination, competition law). There 
is also a new chapter focusing on EU cooperation in 
criminal law and justice. Due to limitations of space, the 
Authors decided, in this edition, to give a general over-
view of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and 
then to focus mainly on the challenges posed by EU 
initiatives relating to criminal law, with the promise to 
keep this issue under review in future editions.
 All chapters are organized according to a well-
established format based on learning features designed 
to guide the reader through each topic: firstly, a short 
presentation of the “central issues” gives to the reader a 
useful roadmap of the matter addressed in the chapter; 
then the presentation and analysis of the topics, accom-
panied by the account of relevant policy and academic 
debate; when necessary, the main aspects of the topic 
are listed in a “summary”; every chapter closes with a 
short “conclusion” and a list of further readings, sug-
gested to go into more depth about the various issues. 
This new edition confirms the distinctive mix of text and 
cases and materials that made the previous editions 
so successful. Extracts of primary and secondary leg-
islation, court judgments and academic journal articles 
are presented with the well experimented two-color text 
design which easily distinguishes between author com-
mentary and cases and material, and makes the book 
more easily readable. Also this edition is enriched by an 
updated Online Resource Center, featuring an useful 
interactive map of Europe presenting key data on every 
single member State and its EU membership, and an 
interesting timeline showing major events in the devel-
opment of the EU.
 This fifth edition of Craig and De Burca’s EU 
Law Text, Cases, and Materials confirms its reputation 
as one of the most authoritative textbooks of EU law. 
It is highly recommended for students at all levels who 
have a general background both in public and private 
law.
Mattia Magrassi
EUSA members interested in reviewing recent 
EU-related books, please fill out the form for po-
tential reviewers located on our website-www.
eustudies.org.
Publishers should send a review copy
of books directly to the EUSA office, 415 Belle-
field Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, 
PA 15206, USA
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Buti, Marco,  Deroose, Servaas, Gaspar, Vitor and 
Martins, João Nogueira (eds.). The Euro: The First 
Decade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010.
 Producing a book on the euro in the middle of 
the present crisis might seem foolhardy at best, espe-
cially since much of the work was completed in 2008 
so that the book could be ready for the tenth anniver-
sary on 1st January 2009. However, with the exception 
of the Foreword by Commissioner Almunia this is a ju-
dicious and wide ranging review of the euro and mon-
etary integration in Europe. One might have expected 
that a book published for the European Commission, 
for whom all the authors then worked (Vitor Gaspar is 
currently Minister of Finance in Portugal) would be full 
of praise even though the contributors are almost en-
tirely academic. In practice it is balanced and reviews 
all aspects of the euro in a critical manner.
 It is a huge piece of work, some thousand pag-
es in length, with sixty contributors. It has been clearly 
edited although inevitably with so much material there 
is some variation in quality. It has eight parts, following 
an introduction setting out what is to come from the 
editors. These parts start with an historical perspec-
tive before going on to optimal currency area (OCA) 
theory, monetary policy, financial markets, fiscal policy, 
growth, trade and volatility, structural reforms and end-
ing with enlargement and governance. Each of the 20 
chapters is subject to a substantial commentary by 
someone from outside the list of authors, so the cri-
tique is present in the book itself.
 Not surprisingly the book is not prescient. 
None of the authors predicts the sovereign debt crisis 
or anything approaching it, despite the fact that the 
first stages of the global financial crisis had already 
occurred. By the same token, however, it is not ruled 
out explicitly by anyone. 
 The historical chapters, by Michael Bordo and 
Harold James, and Barry Eichengreen have their main 
focus on showing how different economic and mon-
etary union in Europe (EMU) is from previous experi-
ences of currencies that are used in more than one 
country. But one of the most useful sections in the 
Bordo-James chapter is the exposition from history of 
the types of events that have previously discredited or 
put severe strain on currencies – the first one of which 
is fiscal policy. The problems the euro is facing at pres-
ent are not unusual in historical terms and indeed the 
weaknesses in the system were well known at the out-
set. The problem is that the pressures have burst out 
before sufficient structural change could be achieved 
in the weaker parts of the system. 
 This leads directly to the chapters by Frances-
co Paolo Megelli and Giancarlo Corsetti who recon-
sider what OCA theory tells us and indeed the draw-
backs of the OCA theory of the 1990s,which was not 
so developed. A key aspect of the speculation is the 
extent to which the member countries would be likely 
to become more similar after membership. The dis-
cussant, Peter Hoeller, produces a telling graph show-
ing how countries have diverged strikingly in terms of 
their real effective exchange rates and export growth. 
The nature of the present problems is clear. Ireland 
alone stands out as a country with an appreciating ex-
change rate and strong growth. All other appreciating 
countries have below average export performance.
 Monetary policy comes in for only limited criti-
cism from Petra Geraats and Manfred Neumann. The 
ECB has not succeeded in keeping inflation below but 
close to 2% over the medium term but it has come 
close to doing so and inflation has never shown signs 
of getting out of hand. What the authors have more 
difficulty with is explaining the low interest rates of 
the period 2003 to 2005, which might be interpreted 
as showing that the euro did not manage to get away 
from dominance by the dollar, as raising rates would 
have raised the exchange rate rather than eliciting a 
response from the Federal Reserve. What they would 
conclude about the last four years is difficult to guess.
 Not surprisingly fiscal policy comprises the lon-
gest section of the book, although the section on the 
operation of financial markets and the international 
role of the euro is not a great deal shorter. There are 
some interesting reflections for present day problems. 
Jürgen von Hagen and Charles Wyplosz note that 
as expected fiscal policy has become asymmetric. In 
downturns it is acyclic because it is constrained by 
the excessive deficit procedure whereas in booms it 
is countercyclical. They also go on to discuss the idea 
that the area as a whole might handle idiosyncratic 
shocks through an insurance policy that permits trans-
fers to an adversely affected country. They do not look 
at the other side of the coin which might suggest that 
countries subject to positive shocks might also make a 
positive transfer to dampen the boom. Xavier Debrun, 
Jean Pisani-Ferry and André Sapir take this issue of 
volatility further by considering whether increases in 
government size have dampened volatility. Their con-
clusion is negative, given the substantial size of the 
government sector in most EU countries it is difficult 
for any change to have much impact at the margin in 
any direction.
 The authors in the book are quite happy to 
handle the controversial area surrounding closer in-
tegration, with Julian Alworth and Giampaolo Arachi 
tackling taxation. They are able to show that invest-
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ment does indeed seem to follow the lower corpo-
rate tax rates, leading to concerns about how far tax 
competition should be allowed to develop. Ray Bar-
rell, Dawn Holland, Iana Liadze and Olga Pomerantz 
are able to show that, for many of the core countries 
at least, the introduction of the euro seems to have 
stimulated growth in a manner not experienced by the 
non-euro countries. In the same way Stefan Gerlach 
and Mathias Hoffmann find evidence that there has 
been a reduction in volatility since the introduction of 
the euro. This seems marked compared with the non-
euro countries. This may be an area where the au-
thors would like to rework their results with the benefit 
of the new data. 
 While these models try to take account of gen-
eral trends with small data periods such as a decade 
they will be heavily influenced by small sample eco-
nomic conditions. Guiseppe Bertola’s chapter on la-
bour markets faces exactly the same problem. With 
the data period used, EMU seems to be associated 
with better performance on unemployment and worse 
performance on inequality (and also convergence be-
tween continental European countries and their com-
petitors). Recent experience may warrant a re-evalua-
tion of the unemployment conclusion.
 The work on the labour market and a further 
chapter by Jacques Pelkmans, Lourdes Acedo Mon-
toya and Alessandro Maravalle on product market 
flexibility tackle the fundamental concern that euro 
area countries may be insufficiently flexible to with-
stand asymmetric shocks under a common currency. 
Pelkmans et al. make a good case for product market 
reforms to achieve greater resilience as well as the 
traditional argument of faster economic growth ad-
vanced in the Lisbon Strategy, inter alia, but they have 
a more difficult job showing the extent of progress and 
the size of the task that remains. The commentator on 
both papers, Gert Jan Koopman, is pessimistic, argu-
ing that there is a long way yet to go for flexibility on 
both markets and asking for a better evidence basis to 
make assessments in future.
 The last two chapters look forward. That by 
Zsolt Darvas and Gyorgy Szapary revisits the strategy 
for future entrants. It provides perhaps the clearest 
advice that has been borne out by recent experience. 
If you have a low price level and a long way to go to 
real convergence there is a strong chance that you will 
experience considerable inflation relative to the rest of 
the area and an ensuing credit and asset price boom. 
There is therefore a temptation to converge first. This 
of course stands in contrast to the Baltic states and in 
particular to Estonia which is the most recent entrant 
to the euro area. These countries started from a very 
weak currency and used currency boards to stabilise. 
There is thus no difference in the real exchange rate 
effect inside or outside the area. They have to adjust 
by being much more flexible in labour and product 
markets, particularly, as has been shown recently, by 
being able to reduce nominal wages and hence adjust 
quickly without the extended period of ‘austerity’ that 
other less flexible countries are experiencing. What the 
authors get completely right is that there is no alterna-
tive to undertaking the structural reforms whether the 
transition is inside or outside the euro area. It is simply 
that if a country fails to make such reforms while out-
side it at least has more tools available to adjust to the 
consequences of such a lack of competitiveness. The 
idea that membership will be sufficient incentive for 
change does not seem to work generally, although it 
has clearly been a successful strategy for Finland, for 
example.
 The book is completed by a careful piece by 
Iain Begg considering what changes in governance 
of EMU might be need as the euro area expands. It 
has really been overtaken by events as the current 
pressures are forcing a very different attitude to gov-
ernance as the spillovers from the actions of some 
member states to others become substantial. Actions 
in the crisis have been decidedly intergovernmental 
rather than Community induced changes. In part this 
has been due to the need for speed and the key role 
of a few countries in determining the overall stance by 
their own actions. The ideas of ‘fiscal union’ and other 
joint instruments are new to the discussion. 
 Probably the editors thought they might next 
organize ‘The Euro at 21’ or possibly ‘The Euro at 25’. 
Now, already they probably need another, albeit small-
er, volume for ‘The Euro: the first 15 years’. However, 
timing will be of the essence. Finding that Greece or 
another country exited between writing and publica-
tion would make such a book a hostage to fortune. 
The present book has come through that battle re-
markably well. The editors are to be congratulated on 
their focus on scholarship rather than immediate poli-
tics. An hurray volume would have been all too easy to 
put together.
David G. Mayes
